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Abstract 
We introduce a new approach to dealing with the well-known logical omniscience problem 
in epistemic logic. Instead of taking possible worlds where each world is a model of classical 
propositional logic, we take possible worlds which are models of a nonstandard propositional logic 
we call NPL, which is somewhat related to relevance logic. This approach gives new insights into 
the logic of implicit and explicit belief considered by Levesque and Lakemeyer. In particular, we 
show that in a precise sense agents in the structures considered by Levesque and Lakemeyer are 
perfect reasoners in NPL. 
1. Introduction 
The standard approach to modelling knowledge, which goes back to Hintikka [ 151, 
is in terms of possible worlds. In this approach, an agent is said to know a fact p if 
40 is true in all the worlds he considers possible. As has been frequently pointed out, 
this approach suffers from what Hintikka termed the logical omniscience problem [ 161: 
agents are so intelligent that they know all the logical consequences of their knowledge. 
Thus, if an agent knows all of the formulas in a set 2 and if 42 logically implies the 
formula q, then the agent also knows 40. In particular, they know all valid formulas 
(including all tautologies of standard propositional logic). Furthermore, the knowledge 
of an agent is closed under implication: if the agent knows rp and knows 40 =S 1+4, then 
the agent also knows I). The reader should note that closure under implication is a 
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special case of logical omniscience only il’ (CF. p * $} logically implies @; although 
this logical implication holds in standard propositional logic, it does not hold in our 
nonstandard propositional logic NPL that we shall introduce later. 
While logical omniscience is not a problem under some conditions (this is true 
in particular for interpretations of knowledge that are often appropriate for analyzing 
distributed systems [ 121 and certain AI systems [ 25]), it is certainly not appropriate 
to the extent that we want to model resource-bounded agents. A number of different 
semantics l’or knowledge have been proposed to get around this problem. The one most 
relevant to our discussion here is what has been called the impossible-worlds approach. 
In this approach. the standard possible worlds are augmented by “impossible worlds” 
(or. perhaps better. notzstundurd v\vrlds), where the customary rules of logic do not 
hold [ 5,6,20,23.29). It is still the case that an agent knows a fact p if p is true in all 
the worlds the agent considers possible, but since the agent may in fact consider some 
nonstandard worlds possible, this will affect what he knows. 
What about logical omniscience ! Although notions like “validity” and “logical con- 
sequence” (which played a prominent part in our informal description of logical omni- 
science) may seem absolute, they arc not; their formal definitions depend on how truth 
is dclined and on the class of worlds being considered. Although there are nonstandard 
worlds in the impossible-worlds approach. validity and logical consequence are taken 
with respect to only the standard worlds, where all the rules of standard logic hold. 
For cxamplc, a formula is valid exactly if it is true in all the standard worlds in every 
structure. The intuition here is that the nonstandard worlds serve only as epistemic al- 
ternatives; although an agent may be muddled and may consider a nonstandard world 
possible, WC (the logicians who get to examine the situation from the outside) know 
that the “real world” must obey the laws of standard logic. If we consider validity and 
logical implication with respect to standard worlds, then it is easy to show that logical 
omniscience fails in “impossibleworlds” structures: an agent does not know all valid 
formulas. nor does he know all the logical consequences of his knowledge here (since, 
in deciding what the agent knows. we must take the nonstandard worlds into account). 
In this paper WC consider an approach which, while somewhat related to the impossib- 
le-worlds approach, stems from a different philosophy. We consider the implications of 
basing a logic of knowledge on a nonstandard logic rather than on standard propositional 
logic. The basic motivation is the observation. implicit in [20] and commented on 
in [ 9.281. that if we weaken the “logical” in “logical omniscience”, then perhaps 
WC can diminish the acuteness of the logical omniscience problem. Thus, instead of 
distinguishing between standard and nonstandard worlds, we take all our worlds to 
be models of a nonstandard logic. Some worlds in a structure may indeed be models 
of standard logic, but they do not have any special status for us. We consider all 
worlds when defining validity and logical consequence; we accept the commitment to 
nonstandard logic. Knowledge is still defined to be truth in all worlds the agent considers 
possible. It thus turns out that we still have the logical omniscience problem. but this 
time with respect to nonstandard logic. The hope is that the logical omniscience problem 
can bc alleviated by appropriately choosing the nonstandard logic. 
There are numerous well-known nonstandard propositional logics, including intuition- 
is(ic propositional logic [ 141, relevance logic [ 11, and the 4-valued logic in [ 2,3,7]. 
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We shall give our own approach in this paper, which is closely related to relevance 
logic and to &valued logic. For each of these nonstandard logics, the starting point is 
the observation that there are a number of properties of implication in standard logic 
that seem inappropriate in certain contexts. In particular, consider a formula such as 
(y A -p) + 9. In standard logic this is valid; that is, from a contradiction one can 
deduce anything. However, consider a knowledge base into which users enter data from 
time to time. As Belnap points out [3], it is almost certainly the case that in a large 
knowledge base, there will be some inconsistencies. One can imagine that at some point 
a user entered the fact that Bob’s salary is $50,000, while at another point, perhaps 
a different user entered the fact that Bob’s salary is $60,000. Thus, in standard logic 
anything can be inferred from this contradiction. One solution to this problem is to 
replace standard worlds by worlds (called situations in [ 19,201, and setups in [ 3,271) 
in which it is possible that a primitive proposition p is true, false, both true and false, or 
neither true and false. We achieve the same effect here by keeping our worlds seemingly 
standard and by using a device introduced in [ 26,271 to decouple the semantics of a 
formula and its negation: for every world s there is a related world s*. A formula lrp 
is true in s iff p is not true in s*. It is thus possible for both sp and Y(D to be true at S, 
and for neither to be true. (The standard worlds are now the ones where s = s*; all the 
laws of standard propositional logic do indeed hold in such worlds.) 
We call the propositional logic that results from the above semantics nonstandard 
propositional logic (NPL). Unlike standard logic, for which rp logically implies $ 
exactly when 40 =+ @ is valid, where p =+ t+4 is defined as ~(p V I), this is not the case 
in NPL. This leads us to include a connective L--) (“strong implication”) in NPL so 
that, among other things, we have that (p logically implies 1+4 iff p of I++ is valid. Of 
course, of agrees with + on the standard worlds, but in general it is different. Given 
our nonstandard semantics, cp it $ comes closer than sp + $ to capturing the idea that 
“if cp is true, then Ic, is true”. Just as in relevance logic, formulas such as (p A -p> c-t q 
are not valid, so that from a contradiction, one cannot conclude everything. In fact, we 
can show that if p and Cc, are standard propositional formulas (those formed from 1 
and A, containing no occurrences of of), then 9 c-t 1+4 is valid exactly if p entails I/ 
in the relevance logic R [ 26,271. In formulas with nested occurrences of of, however, 
the semantics of it is quite different from the relevance logic notion of entailment. 
We are most interested in applying our nonstandard semantics to knowledge. It turns 
out that although agents in our logic are not perfect reasoners as far as standard logic 
goes, they are perfect reasoners in nonstandard logic. In particular, as we show, the com- 
plete axiomatization for the standard possible-worlds interpretation of knowledge can be 
converted to a complete axiomatization for the nonstandard possible-world interpretation 
of knowledge essentially by replacing the inference rules for standard propositional logic 
by inference rules for NPL. We need, however, to use + rather =S in formulating the 
axioms of knowledge. Thus, the distribution uxiom, valid in the standard possible-worlds 
interpretation, says (Kip A Ki(p + 4)) + Ki+. This says that an agent’s knowledge 
is closed under logical consequence: if the agent knows p and knows that 40 implies ~4, 
then he also knows $. The analogue for this axiom holds in our nonstandard interpre- 
tation, once we replace =S by ~-f. This is appropriate since it is of that captures the 
intuitive notion of implication in our framework. The other basic property of knowledge 
(knowledge generalization) remains unchanged: if cp is valid, then so is Kiqo. That is, 
the agents know every valid formula (although the set of valid formulas are distinct 
for the standard logic and for our nonstandard logic). Thus, the basic properties of 
knowledge (closure under logical consequence, and knowledge of valid formulas) re- 
main unchanged; in some sense. we have decoupled the properties of the underlying 
propositional logic, which change drastically. from the properties of knowledge, which 
remain essentially the same. 
Our approach has an additional nice payoff: we show that in a certain important 
application we can obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for reasoning about knowledge. 
By contrast, under the standard approach, the complexity of such reasoning in that 
application is co-NP-complete. 
It is instructive to compare our approach with that of Levesque and Lakemeyer 
1 19,20 1. Our semantics is essentially equivalent to theirs. But while they avoid logical 
omniscience by giving nonstandard worlds a secondary status and defining validity only 
with respect to standard worlds. we accept logical omniscience, albeit with respect to 
nonstandard logic. Thus, our results justify and elaborate a remark made in 19,281 that 
agents in Levesque’s model are perfect reasoners in relevance logic. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our non- 
standard propositional logic, and investigate some of its properties. In Section 3, we 
review the standard possible-worlds approach. In Section 4, we give our nonstandard 
approach to possible worlds. In Section 5, we add strong implication (the propositional 
connective -+) to our syntax. and thereby obtain our full nonstandard propositional 
logic NPL. In Section 6, we give a sound and complete axiomatization for NPL, and 
give a sound and complete axiomatization for the logic of knowledge using NPL as a 
basis rather than classical propositional logic. We also show that the validity problem 
for NPL is co-NP-complete, just as for standard propositional logic, and the valid- 
ity prohlem for our nonstandard logic of knowledge is PSPACE-complete, just as for 
the standard logic of knowledge. In Section 7, we give the payoff we promised, of a 
polynomial-time algorithm for querying a knowledge base in certain natural cases. We 
relate our results to those in the impossible-worlds approach in Section 8. Levesque and 
Lakemeyer’s formalism is compared with ours in Section 9. We give our conclusions in 
Section IO. 
2. A nonstandard propositional logic 
Although by now it is fairly well entrenched, standard propositional logic has several 
undesirable and counterintuitive properties. When we are first introduced to propositional 
logic in school, WC are perhaps somewhat uncomfortable when we learn that “cp =+ I/J” 
is taken to be simply an abbreviation for lcp v ti. Why should the fact that either V,D is 
true or Cc, is true correspond to “if p is true then fi is true”? 
Another problem with standard propositional logic is that it is fragile: a false statement 
implies everything. For example, the formula (p A up) + 9 is valid, even if p and 9 
are unrelated. As we observed in the introduction, one situation where this could be a 
serious problem occurs when we have a large knowledge base of many facts, obtained 
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from multiple sources, and where a theorem prover is used to derive various conclusions 
from this knowledge base. 
To deal with these problems, many alternatives to standard propositional logic have 
been proposed. We focus on one particular alternative here, and consider its conse- 
quences. 
The idea is to allow formulas q and 740 to have “independent” truth values. Thus, 
rather than requiring that ~cp be true iff rp is not true, we wish instead to allow the 
possibility that 7~ can be either true or false, regardless of whether rp is true or 
false. Intuitively, the truth of formulas can be thought of as being determined by some 
knowledge base. We can think of p being true as meaning that the fact 9 has been put 
into a knowledge base of true formulas, and we can think of ~cp being true as meaning 
that the fact 40 has been put into a knowledge base of false formulas. Since it is possible 
for 9 to have been put in both knowledge bases, it is possible for both p and 79 to be 
true. Similarly, if q had not been put into either knowledge base, then neither p nor 140 
would be true. 
There are several ways to capture this intuition formally (see [ 81). We now discuss 
one approach, due to [ 26,27]. For each world s, there is an adjunct world s*, which 
will be used for giving semantics to negated formulas. Instead of defining l(p to hold 
at s iff p does not hold at s, we instead define 19 to hold at s iff 40 does not hold at 
s*. Note that if s = s*, then this gives our usual notion of negation. Very roughly, we 
can think of a state s is as consisting of a pair (Br, BF) of knowledge bases; BT is the 
knowledge base of true facts, while BF is the knowledge base of false facts. The state -- 
s* should be thought as the adjunct pair (BF, BT), where G is the complement of BT, - 
and BF is the complement of BF. Continuing this intuition, to see if 50 is true at s, we 
consult BT; to see if 740 is true at s, i.e., if 9 is false at s, we consult BF. Notice that - - 
cp E BF iff q $ B F, Since BF is the knowledge base of true facts at s*, we have an 
alternate way of checking if cp is false at s: we can check if (p is not true at s*. 
Notice that under this interpretation, not only is s * is the adjunct state of s, but s 
is the adjunct state of s*; i.e., .r** = s (where s** = (s*) *). To support this intuitive 
view of s as a pair of knowledge bases and s* as its adjunct, we make this a general 
requirement in our framework. 
We define the formulas of the propositional logic by starting with a set @ of primitive 
propositions that describe basic facts about the domain of discourse, and forming more 
complicated formulas by closing off under the Boolean connectives --, and A. Thus, if p 
and + are formulas, then so are ~cp and 9 A $. When we deal only with propositional 
formulas, we can identify a world with a classical truth assignment to the primitive 
propositions, and we can decide the truth of a propositional formula at a world s by 
considering only s and s*. Thus, we define an NPL structure to consist of an ordered 
pair (s, t) of classical truth assignments to the set @ of primitive propositions. We 
take * to be a function that maps a truth assignment in an NPL structure to the other 
truth assignment in that structure. Thus, if S = (s, t), then S* = t and t* = s. Truth is 
defined relative to a pair (S, u), where S is an NPL structure and u is one of the truth 
assignments in S. We define 140 to be true at (S, U) if p is not true at u*; thus, we use 
the other truth assignment in order to define negation. More formally, given an NPL 
structure S = (s, t), and u E {s, t}, we define the semantics as follows: 
0 ( S, U) k p iff u(p) = true for il primitive proposition p. 
0 (.S,U) ~(FAQ iff CS,u) kcp and (S.M) b*. 
0 (S.rO b T(D iff (S,U*) pep. 
WC call the logic defined so far NPL- Later, we shall add strong implication (-+) 
to get NPL. 
Note that if S = (s, s) for some truth assignment s ( that is, s = sX), then (S, s) k ~cp 
iff (S. .s) p 9. Hence, in this case. for every propositional formula 9, we have that 
(S. .s) k p precisely if cp is true under the truth assignment s, and so we are back to 
standard propositional logic. Note also that in the genera1 case, it is possible for neither 
cpnorIcptobetrueat14(if(S,Ir)~cpand(S,r**)~cp)andforboth~and~~tobe 
true at II (if ($11) kcp and (S,u*) pep). 
This approach is equivalent to Belnap’s 4-valued logic [ 2,3], in which he has four 
truth values: True, False, Both, and None. Belnap’s approach avoids the use of the x 
to define negation. The reason WC make use of * IS so that we can treat negation in 
a uniform manner. For example. later on we shall extend to an epistemic logic, and 
the USC of * decouples the semantics of K,(o and lK;p. By contrast, in order to extend 
Lcvesque’s propositional logic in [ 201 to an epistemic logic where the semantics of K,p 
and -K,p are decoupled, Lakemeyer [ 191 finds it necessary to introduce two possibility 
relations, K,‘ and KY-. As we shall discuss in Section 9, the truth of a formula K,p is 
determined by the possibility relation K,‘, while the truth of lK;cp is determined by the 
possibility relation KC,-. By using =. we need only one possibility relation K, for agent 
i. not two. Furthermore, when we add a new connective to the language, as we do later 
when we add strong implication (L-T). it may not be clear how to define the negation 
(for a formula -( 91 9 (~2)) in a natural manner that decouples its semantics from that 
of $01 c-- ~2. This is done automatically for us by the use of *. 
Just as in standard propositional logic, we take cpr V cp2 to be an abbreviation for 
I( alar A -cpz), and ~1 3 91 to be an abbreviation for 79) V cp2. Since the semantics 01 
negation is now nonstandard, it is not a priori clear how the propositional connectives 
behave in our nonstandard semantics. For example, while ~1 A 92 holds by definition 
precisely when cpr and ‘p2 both hold, it is not clear that 91 V ~2 holds precisely when 
at lcast one of cpr or cp: holds. It is even less clear how negation will interact in our 
nonstandard semantics with conjunction and disjunction. 
The next proposition shows that even though we have decoupled the semantics for (o 
and mlp, the propositional connectives 7. A. and V still behave and interact in a fairly 
standard way. 
Proof. We prove only ( I ) and (2). since the proofs of the rest are similar. 
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As for (2), 
(Ku) kw Vq2 iff (KU) k~(lpi A7(~2), 
iff (S,u*) p 71 A 7472, 
iff (S,u*) p-m or (S,u*> k-92, 
iff (S,u** ) k9i or (Ku**) k(~2, 
iff (Ku> +a or t&u) +(p2. 0 
In contrast to the behavior of 1, A, and V, the connective + behaves rather peculiarly, 
since (S, U) k ~1 + 92 holds precisely when (S, u’) + rpt implies that (S, U) b (~2. We 
will come back to the issue of the definition of implication later. 
Validity and logical implication are defined in the usual way: 9 is valid if it holds 
at every (S, u), and 9 logically implies Cc, if (S, u) \ cp implies (S, u) k @ for every 
(S, u). What are the valid formulas? The formula (p A up) + 4, which wreaked havoc 
in deriving consequences from a knowledge base, is no longer valid. What about even 
simpler tautologies of standard propositional logic, such as up Vp? This formula, too, is 
not valid. How about p + p? It is not valid either, since p + p is just an abbreviation 
for lp V p, which, as we just said, is not valid. In fact, no formula is valid! 
Theorem 2.2. No formula of NPL- is valid. 
Proof. This follows from a stronger result (Theorem 4.2) that we shall prove in Sec- 
tion 4. 0 
Thus, the validity problem is very easy: the answer is always “No, the formula is not 
valid!” Thus, the notion of validity is trivially uninteresting here. In contrast, there are 
many nontrivial logical implications; for example, as we see from Proposition 2.1, ~~~ 
logically implies C,O, and l( cpi A 92) logically implies 1~1 V 7~2. 
The reader may be puzzled why Proposition 2.1 does not provide us some tautologies. 
For example, Proposition 2.1 tells us that 1140 logically implies rp. Doesn’t this mean 
that ~~~ + 9 is a tautology? This does not follow. In classical propositional logic, 
40 logically implies Cc, iff the formula p + Cc, is valid. This is not the case in NPL. 
For example, p logically implies 9, yet p + 9 (i.e., lcp V rp) is not valid in NPL. In 
Section 5, we define a new connective that allows us to express logical implication in 
the language, just as + does for classical logic. We close this section by characterizing 
the complexity of deciding logical implication in NPL-. 
Theorem 2.3. The logical implication problem in NPL- is co-NP-complete. 
The proof of this thcorcm will appear in Section 8, when we have developed some 
more machinery. This theorem says that logical implication in NPL- is as hard as 
logical implication in standard propositional logic, that is, co-NP-complete. We shall see 
in Theorem 4.3 that a similar phenomenon takes place for knowledge formulas. 
3. Standard possible worlds 
We review in this section the standard possible-worlds approach to knowledge. The 
intuitive idea behind the possible-worlds model is that besides the true state of affairs, 
there arc a number of other possible states of affairs or “worlds”. Given his current 
information. an agent may not he able to tell which of a number of possible worlds 
describes the actual state of affairs. An agent is then said to knubt, ;L fact cp if cp is true 
at all the worlds he considers possible (given his current information). 
The notion of possible worlds is t’orma1iLed by means of Kripke structures. Suppose 
that we have II agents, named I. . II, and a set (D of primitive propositions. A standard 
Kripkr structure M for II agents over 9 is a tuple (S, TT. ICI, . . , K,,), where S is a set of 
~~~~r~lrl.s. n as ociates with each world in 5’ a truth assignment to the primitive propositions 
of @ (i.e.. rTT( s) : (I, --t {true, false} for each world s E S), and Ic, is a Dinup relatiorz 
on S. called a possibility relation. We refer to standard Kripke structures as standard 
,rttxctures or simply as structurz3. 
Intuitively, the truth assignment r(s) tells us whether p is true or false in a world 
II’. The binary relation K, is intended to capture the possibility relation according to 
agent i: (s. I) t K, if agent i considers world t possible, given his information in world 
.Y. The class of all structures for II agents over (D is denoted by Mf. Usually, neither n 
nor (I, arc relevant to our discusion. so we typically write M instead of Mr. 
We dcfinc the formulas of the logic by starting with the primitive propositions in 4, 
and form more complicated l’ormulas by closin, cr off under Boolean connectives 1 and 
A and the modalities /Cl.. . , K,,. Thus, if (c and 3/ are formulas, then so are ycp, q~$, 
and K,p, for i = I. . II. WC define the connectives V and + to be abbreviations as 
hefore. The class of all formulas for II agents over @ is denoted by 13:. Again, when 
II and @ are not relevant to our discussion, we write C instead of Cr. We refer to 
C-formulas as stundard~orml~1a.r. 
We arc now ready to assign truth values to formulas. A formula will be true or false 
at :L world in a structure. We define the notion (M, s) k q~, which can be read as “9 
i-s true ut (M, .s)” or “q holds at (M. .s)” or “CM, .s) sutis$es cp”, by induction on the 
structure of cp. 
CM. s) 1 p (for a primitive proposition 11 E @) iff r(s)(p) = true. 
(M.s)k -spiff (M,s) #p. 
tM..s) k cpA$ iff (M,s) kcp and (M,s) p=. 
(MA) b K,v ill‘ (M,f) b cp for all t such that (.s,t) E K, 
The first three clauses in this definition correspond to the standard clauses in the 
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definition of truth for propositional logic. The last clause captures the intuition that 
agent i knows 9 in world s of structure M exactly if cp is true at all worlds that i 
considers possible in s. 
Given a structure M = (S, rr, ICI,. . . , Ic,), we say that p is valid in M, and write 
M k 9, if (M, s) b 40 for every world s in S, and say that (D is satis$able in M if 
(M, s) k p for some world s in S. We say that p is valid with respect to M, and write 
M k p, if it is valid with respect to all structures of M, and it is satisjiable with respect 
to M if it is satisfiable in some structure in M. It is easy to check that a formula p is 
valid in M (respectively, valid with respect to M) if and only if 1~ is not satisfiable 
in M (respectively, not satisfiable with respect to M). 
To get a sound and complete axiomatization, one starts with propositional reasoning 
and adds to it axioms and inference rules for knowledge. By propositional reasoning we 
mean all substitution instances of sound propositional inference rules of propositional 
logic. An inference rule is a statement of the form “from 2 infer a”, where 2 U {CT} is 
a set of formulas. (See [ IO] for a discussion of inference rules.) Such an inference rule 
is sound if for every substitution 7 of formulas (~1,. , ppk for the primitive propositions 
PI,..., pk in 2 and u, if all the formulas in T[ 21 are valid, then ~[g] is also valid. 
Modus ponens (“from p and (o + $ infer I,!?‘) is an example of a sound propositional 
inference rule. Of course, if u is a valid propositional formula, then “from 0 infer g” 
is a sound propositional inference rule. It is easy to show that “from 2 infer a” is a 
sound propositional inference rule iff u is a propositional consequence of 2 [ IO], which 
explains why the notion of inference is often confused with the notion of consequence. 
As we shall see later, the two notions do not coincide in our nonstandard propositional 
logic NPL. 
Consider the following axiom system K, which in addition to propositional reasoning 
consists of one axiom and one rule of inference given below: 
Al. (K,p /I Ki( p + 9) ) =F- Ki$ (Distribution Axiom). 
PR. All sound inference rules of propositional logic. 
Rl. From 40 infer Kiqo (Knowledge Generalization). 
One should view the axioms and inference rules above as schemes, i.e., K actually 
consists of all C-instances of the above axioms and inference rules. 
Theorem 3.1 (Chellas [ 41) . K is a sound and complete axiomatization for validity of 
L-formulas in M. 
We note that PR can be replaced by any complete axiomatization of standard propo- 
sitional logic that includes modus ponens as an inference rule, which is the usual way 
that K is presented (cf. [ 41.) We chose to present K in this unusual way in anticipation 
of our treatment of NPL in Section 5. 
Finally, instead of trying to prove validity, one may wish to check validity algorith- 
mically. 
Theorem 3.2 (Ladner [ 181 ). The problem of determining validity of L:formulas in 
.bl is PSPACE-complete. 
4. Nonstandard possible worlds 
Our main goal in this paper is to help alleviate logical omniscience by defining Kripke 
structures that are based on a nonstandard propositional logic, rather than basing them 
on classical propositional logic. We shall base our nonstandard Kripke structures on our 
nonstandard propositional logic: in particular, we make use of the * operator of Routley 
and Meyer 126,271. 
A twttstandurd Kripke .strucrure is a tuple (S, n, /Cl,. . K,,,* ), where (S, IT, ICI,. , 
K,,) is a (Kripke) structure. and where * is a unary function with domain and range 
the set S of worlds (where we write .s* for the result of applying the function * to the 
world .s) such that s** = .r for each s E S. We refer to nonstandard Kripke structures as 
ttottstutrdard .s~ructure.s. We call them nonstandard, since we think of a world where (o 
and 7~ are both true or both false as nonstandard. We denote the class of nonstandard 
structures for n agents over @ by ~\i,ti~. As before, when n and @ are not relevant to 
our discussion, we write ,4f:2/L instead of ,l~M~. 
The definition of k for the language L for nonstandard structures is the same as for 
standard structures, except for the clause for negation: 
(M.,s) k-79 iff (M.s*) PP. 
In particular, the clause for K, does not change at all: 
(M..s) k K,cp it’f (M.r) bp for all t such that (.r,t) t K,. 
Our semantics is closely related to that of Levesque [ 201 and Lakemeyer [ 191. 
We discuss their approach in Section 9. Unlike our approach, in their approach it is 
necessary to introduce two K‘, relations for each agent i, to deal separately with the truth 
of formulas of the form K,cp and the truth of formulas of the form ~K;cp. 
Similarly to before, we say that 9 is valid with respect to NM. and write NM 1 cp, 
if (M. s) b p for every nonstandard structure M and every state s of M. 
As we noted earlier, it is possible for neither cp nor 140 to be true at world s, and for 
both cp and 1~ to be true at world s. Let us refer to a world where neither p nor lcp is 
true as incomplete (with respect to p); otherwise, s is complete. The intuition behind an 
incomplete world is that there is not enough information to determine whether 40 is true 
or whether 140 is true. What about a world where both 9 and lrp are true? We cell such 
a world incoherenr (with respect to cp) ; otherwise, s is coherent. The intuition behind 
an incoherent world is that it is overdetermined: it might correspond to a situation where 
several people have provided mutually inconsistent information. A world s is standard 
if .V = s*. Note that for a standard world, the definition of the semantics of negation is 
equivalent to the standard definition. In particular, a standard world s is both complete 
and coherent: for each formula cp exactly one of cp or ~cp is true at s. 
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Remark 4.1. If we consider a fixed structure, it is possible for a world to be both 
complete and coherent without being standard. Nevertheless, there is an important sense 
in which this can be viewed as “accidental”, and that the only worlds that can be 
complete and coherent are those that are standard. To understand this, we must work 
at the level of frames [ 11,131 rather than structures. Essentially, a frame is a structure 
without the truth assignment 7r. Thus, in our present context, we define a (nonstandard) 
frame F to be a tuple (S, ICI,. . , Kc,,* ), where S is a set of worlds, ICI,. . . , K, are 
binary relations on S, and * is a unary function with domain and range the set S of 
worlds, such that s** = s. We say that the nonstandard structure (S, r, ICI, . . . , K, ,* > is 
bused on the frame (S, Kc1 , . . . , K,,” ) . We say that a world s is complete (respectively 
coherent) with respect to the frame F if s is complete (respectively coherent) with 
respect to every structure based on F; the world s is standard with respect to F exactly 
if s* = S. It is now easy to see that if s is complete and coherent with respect to a frame 
F if and only if s is standard in F. 
What are the properties of knowledge in nonstandard structures? One way to charac- 
terize the formal properties of a semantic model is to consider all the validities under 
that semantics. In our case, we should consider the formulas valid in NM. Theorem 2.2 
tells us that no formula of NPL- is valid. It turns out that even though we have enlarged 
the language to include knowledge modalities, it is still the case that no formula (of C) 
is valid. Even more, there is a single counterexample that simultaneously shows that no 
formula is valid! 
Theorem 4.2. There is no formula of L that is valid with respect to NM. In fact, 
there is a nonstandard structure M and a world s of M such that every formula of L is 
false at s, and a world t of M such that every formula of L is true at t. 
Proof. Let M = (S,z-,Kl,... , K,,* ) be a special nonstandard structure, defined as 
follows. Let S contain only two worlds s and t, where t = s* (and so s = t*). Define 
r by letting rr( s) be the truth assignment where r(s) (p) = false for every primitive 
proposition p, and letting m(t) be the truth assignment where n(t) (p) = true for 
every primitive proposition p. Define each Ki to be {(s, s) , (t, t)}. By a straightforward 
induction on formulas, it follows that for every formula p of L, we have (M, s) p q~ 
and (M, t) k 9. In particular, every formula of L is false at s, and every formula of L 
is true at t. Since every formula of L is false at s, no formula of L is valid with respect 
toNM. 0 
It follows from Theorem 4.2 that we cannot use validities to characterize the properties 
of knowledge in nonstandard structures, since there are no validities! We will come back 
to this point later. 
As we noted in the introduction, our basic motivation is the observation that if 
we weaken the “logical” in “logical omniscience”, then perhaps we can diminish the 
acuteness of the logical omniscience problem. Logical implication is indeed weaker 
in nonstandard structures than in standard structures, as we now show. If (D logically 
implies $ in nonstandard structures, then p logically implies IJ in standard structures, 
since standard structures can he viewed as a special case of nonstandard structures. 
However, the converse is false. since, for example, (40, p 3 @} logically implies q5 in 
standard structures hut not in nonstandard structures. 
Nevertheless, logical omniscience did not go away! If an agent knows all of the 
formulas in a set I?‘. and if 2 logically implies the formula cp, then the agent also knows 
cp. Because, as we just showed. we have weakened the notion of logical implication, the 
problem of logical omniscience is not as acute as it was in the standard approach. For 
example, knowledge of valid formulas, which is one form of omniscience, is completely 
innocuous here, since there are no valid formulas. Also, an agent’s knowledge need 
not be closed under implication; an agent may know cp and 9 + I,!J without knowing 
I/J. since. as we noted above, cp and cp + $ do not logically imply $ with respect to 
nonstandard structures. 
WC saw that the problem of determining validity is easy (since the answer is always 
“No”). Validity is a special case of logical implication: a formula is valid iff it is a 
logical consequence of the empty set. Unfortunately, logical implication is not that easy 
to determine. 
Theorem 4.3. 77~ logical irnplicutiorl problem for C~formu1a.s in nonstandurd struc- 
tures is PSPACE-complete. 
As with Theorem 2.3. the proof of this theorem will appear in Section 8, when we 
have developed some more machinery. 
Theorem 4.3 asserts that nonstandard logical implication for knowledge formulas (i.c.. 
C-formulas) is as hard as standard logical implication for knowledge formulas, that is. 
PSPACE-complete. This is analogous to Theorem 2.3, where the same phenomenon 
takes place for propositional formulas. 
WC saw in Theorem 4.2 that there are no valid formulas. In particular, we cannot 
capture properties of knowledge by considering all of the formulas that are valid, since 
there arc none. By contrast, Theorem 4.3 tells us that the structure of logical implication 
is quite rich (since the logical implication problem is PSPACE-complete). In classical 
logic. we can capture logical implication in the language by using +: thus, cp logically 
implies IJ precisely if the formula cp =+ $ is valid. In the next section, we enrich our 
language by adding a new propositional connective -+, with which it is possible to 
express logical implication in the language. 
5. Strong implication 
In Section 2 we introduced a nonstandard propositional logic, motivated by our dis- 
comfort with certain classic tautologies. such as (p A lp) + 9, and--lo and hehold!- 
under this semantics these formulas are no longer valid. Unfortunately, the bad news 
is that other formulas, such as cp * cp, that blatantly seem as if they should he valid, 
are not valid either under this approach. In fact, no formula is valid in the nonstandard 
approach! It seems that we have thrown out the baby with the bath water. In particular, 
WC could not characterize the properties of knowledge in the nonstandard approach by 
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considering validities, because there are no validities. 
To get better insight into this problem, let us look more closely at why the formula 
40 + p is not valid. Our intuition about implication tells us that ~1 + (Do should 
say “if ~1 is true, then 5~2 is true”. However, ~1 + 402 is defined to be lcpt V ~2. 
In standard propositional logic, this is the same as “if 4pi is true, then ‘p2 is true”. 
However, in nonstandard structures, these are not equivalent. Thus, the problem is not 
with our semantics, but rather with the definition of +. This motivates the definition of 
a new propositional connective -+, which we call strong implication, where ~01 it ~2 
is defined to be true if whenever 91 is true, then ~2 is true. Formally, in the pure 
propositional case where S = (s, t) is an NPL structure and u E {s, t}, we define 
(Xu) /=R - P2 iff (S, U) + ~2 whenever (Xu) l=(DI. 
That is, (S, U) k (~1 + ~2 iff either (S, U) v pi or (S, U) 1 (~2. Similarly, if M is a 
nonstandard structure and s is a world of M, then 
(M,s) bpi -+ 492 iff (if (M,s) ~COI, then (M,s) 1~2). 
Equivalently, (M, s) b ~1 -+ ‘p2 iff either (M,s) kpi or (M,s) k(p2. 
In the pure propositional case, we refer to this logic as nonstandard propositional 
logic, or NPL. In the case of knowledge formulas, we denote by Cl,‘, or L” for short, 
the set of formulas obtained by modifying the definition of Lf by adding c-f as a new 
propositional connective. 
Strong implication is indeed a new connective, that is, it cannot be defined using 1 
and A. For, there are no valid formulas using only 1 and A, whereas by using -+, there 
are validities: (o c--) p is an example, as is ~1 c--f (cpt V (02). 
The next proposition shows a sense in which strong implication is indeed stronger 
than implication. 
Proposition 5.1. Let ~1 and 402 be formulas in L. If ~1 -+ 92 is valid with respect to 
nonstandard Kripke structures, then 91 + 402 is valid with respect to standard Kripke 
structures. However the converse is false. 
Proof. Assume that ~1 c-f ~2 is valid with respect to nonstandard Kripke structures. 
As we remarked after the proof of Theorem 4.2, a standard Kripke structure can be 
viewed as a special case of a nonstandard Kripke structure. Hence, spi -+ ~2 is valid 
with respect to standard Kripke structures. In a standard Kripke structure, (pi of 92 is 
equivalent to cpi =+ ~2. So ~1 + ~2 is valid with respect to standard Kripke structures. 
The converse is false, since the formula (pulp) + q is valid in standard propositional 
logic, whereas the formula (p A -p) c--i q is not valid in NPL. 0 
As we promised earlier, we can now express logical implication in L’, using *, just 
as we can express logical implication in standard structures, using +. The following 
proposition is almost immediate. 
Proposition 5.2. Let ~1 and ~2 be formulas in L’. Then cp1 logically implies ~2 in 
nonstandard structures iff ~1 c--f 92 is valid with respect to nonstandard structures. 
The connective 4 is somewhat related to the connective --f of relevance logic, which 
is meant to capture the notion of relevant entailment. A formula of the form 91 ---f qpz, 
where cpl and 92 are standard propositional formulas, is called a first-degree entailment. 
(See 18 ] for an axiomatization of first-degree entailments.) It is not hard to show that if 
cp~ and ‘p2 are standard propositional formulas (and so have no occurrence of q), then 
cpl ~+ ‘p2 is a theorem of the relevance logic R [ 26,271 exactly if ~1 q ~42 is valid in 
NPL (or equivalently, ~1 logically implies ~2 in NPL-). So ~1 f 92 can be viewed as 
saying that 91 + ~2 is valid. I n f ormulas with nested occurrences of q, however, the 
semantics of Q is quite different from that of relevant entailment. In particular, while 
p L-+ (4 q p) IS valid in NPL, the analogous formula p 4 (4 --i p) is not a theorem 
of relevance logic 1 I 1. 
With c.-. WC greatly increase the expressive power of our language. For example, in 
L: (the language without *), we cannot say that a formula 40 is false. That is. there is 
no formula @ such that (M. t) b (I/ iff (M, t) p p. For suppose that there were such 
a formula (CI. Let M and t be as in Theorem 4.2. Then (M, t) p (c/ and (M, t) p p, a 
contradiction. What about the formula lp’? This formula says that 79 is true. but does 
not say that p is false. However. once we move to C’, it is possible to say that a 
formula is false, as we shall see in the next proposition. In order to state this and other 
results, it turns out to be convenient to have an abbreviation for the proposition false 
(which is false at every world). The way we abbreviate false depends on the context. 
When dealing with the standard semantics in the language /Z, we take true to be an 
abbreviation for some fixed standard tautology such as p + p. When dealing with the 
nonstandard semantics in the language C”, we take true to be an abbreviation for some 
lixed nonstandard tautology such as p c--i p. In both cases, we abbreviate Ttrue by false. 
In fact, it will be convenient to think of true and false as constants in the language 
(rather than as abbreviations) with the obvious semantics. The next proposition, which 
shows how to say that a formula is thlsc, is straightforward. 
Proposition 5.3. Let M be u nonstandard structure, and let s be a world of M. Then 
(M,s) pep ifl(M,.v) ~‘pc--+.fhlw. 
This proposition enables us to embed standard propositional logic into NPL, by 
replacing 1~ by 9 ci false. We shall make use of this technique in the next section, 
when we give a sound and complete axiomatization for NPL, and analyze the complexity 
of the validity problem. 
6. Axiomatizations and complexity 
In this section, we provide sound and complete axiomatizations for our nonstandard 
propositional logic NPL, and for our nonstandard epistemic logic, and prove their cor- 
rectness. We also show that the validity problem for NPL is co-NP-complete, just as 
for standard propositional logic, and the validity problem for our nonstandard logic of 
knowledge is PSPACE-complete, just as for the standard logic of knowledge. 
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6.1. A sound and complete axiomatization for NPL 
In this subsection we give an axiomatization for NPL and prove that it is sound 
and complete. We also show that the validity problem is co-NP-complete, just as for 
propositional logic, and discuss an interesting new inference rule. For the purposes of 
this subsection only, it is convenient to enrich our standard propositional language so 
that + and false are first-class objects, and not just abbreviations. Thus, let Li contain 
all formulas built up out of false and the primitive propositions in @, by closing off 
under the Boolean connectives 1, A, and +. Let CT be the negation-free formulas in 
Cl (those built up out of false and the primitive propositions in @, by closing off under 
the Boolean connectives A and +). We define C2 and L: identically, but using q 
instead of +. 
As a tool in developing an axiomatization for NPL, and motivated by Proposition 5.3, 
we explore the relationship between the standard and nonstandard semantics. This will 
make it possible to use (in part) the standard axiomatization. If 9 E Cl, then we 
define the formula qpnst E Ci by recursively replacing in cp all subformulas of the 
form -q4 by 9 w false and all occurrences of + by c-) (the superscript nst stands 
for nonstandard). Note that qnst is negation-free. We also define what is essentially the 
inverse transformation: if cp E Cl, let (ps’ E CT be the result of replacing in cp all 
occurrences of L) by +. It is easy to see that the transformations “S and St are inverses 
when restricted to negation-free formulas. In particular: 
Lemma 6.1. If p E Cl, then (q?‘)“” = 40. 
If s is a truth assignment, and q E Cl, then we write s k p if rp is true under the 
truth assignment s. 
Proposition 6.2. Assume that S = (s, t) is an NPL structure, u E {s, t}, and 40 E Cl. 
Then (S,u) /=(pnSf ijfu bqo. 
Proof. We prove this proposition by induction on the structure of 40. The result is 
immediate if 40 is false, a primitive proposition, or of the form vi A 502. If 40 is -1,4, then 
(S, u) k pflS’ iff (S, u) + @““’ c-t false, 
iff (S,u) Fens’, 
iff (by induction hypothesis)u p 1+4, 
iff u /= q. 
If qo is @i + $2, then 
(S,u) k qnst iff (S, u) k (4% )“st of (4f42)nst, 
iff (S, u) F (91 jnst or (S, u> k (rC12jnstt 
iff (by induction hypothesis) u p @i or u b &, 
iff u b q. 0 
Proposition 6.2 tells us that “” gives an embedding of standard propositional logic 
into NPL. The following corollary is immediate. If q E Ll, then when we say that 40 is 
a standard propositional tautology, we mean that s b p for every truth assignment s. 
Corollary 6.3. Asswne that cp e Cl. Then qo “” is valid in NPL iff cp is a standard 
propositional tautology. 
In particular. it lhllows from Corollary 6.3 that the validity problem for NPL is at 
least as hard as that of propositional logic, namely, co-NP-complete. In fact, this is 
precisely the complexity. 
Theorem 6.4. Thp vulidit! problrrrr ,for NPL f~~rn~ula.s is co-NP-complete. 
Proof. The lower bound is immediate from Corollary 6.3. The upper bound follows 
from the fact that to determine if an NPL formula u is not valid, we can simply guess 
an NPL structure S = (s, r) and II (7 {s, t}. and verify that (S, u) p c. 0 
Another connection between standard propositional logic and NPL is due to the fact 
that negated propositions in NPL behave in some sense as “independent” propositions. 
WC say that a formula cp t lz is pseudo-positive if 1 occurs in p only immediately in 
front of a primitive proposition. For example, the formula y A lp is pseudo-positive, 
while m~(p A y) is not. If cp is a pseudo-positive formula, then qO+ is obtained from ‘p by 
replacing every occurrence 11) of a negated proposition by a new proposition ii. Note 
that q! is a negation-free li)rmula. 
Proposition 6.5. Let cp be (I l).sL~rldo-positir,~,,fhrt11ulu. Then cp is valid in NPL iff c,o’ is 
vu/id irl NPL. 
Proof. We shall prove the “only if” direction. since the proof of the converse is very 
similar. Assume that cp is valid in NPL,. Let (0 be the set of primitive propositions 
(so that in particular, every primitive proposition that appears in p is in @), and let 
9’ = @ 1.i {ii / p t a}. Let s and t be arbitrary truth assignments over @‘, and let 
S = (.\.t). Take II c {.s.t}. To show that cp’ is valid in NPL. we must show that 
(XI/) + p’. Let .s’.I’ hc truth assignments over rl, defined by letting s’(p) = true iff 
II( 11) = true, and t’( I>) = true ifi‘ II( 17 ) = false. Let S’ = ( .s’, t’ ). Assume that p E cf. 
It ia easy to see that (S’..s’) b 11 ill’ (S./O k 17% and (S’..s’) b .-lp iff (KU) k ii. A 
straightforward induction on the structure of formulas (where we take advantage of the 
fact that cp is pseudo-positive) then shows that (S’, s’) /= 40 iff (S, I*) /= qot. But p is 
valid. so C 5”. s’) k p, Hence. ( S. IL) k cp. . as desired. Cl 
Corollary 6.6. Let qc be u p.sel”do-pc’.sitir,e fi~nnulu. Then qc is valid in NPL ij‘ (qc ’ ) ‘;’ 
is (I stmdurd propositionul tuutoiog\: 
Proof. By Proposition 6.5, q is valid in NPL iff q’ is valid in NPL. By Lemma 6.1, 
cp’ = ((cp’ l”‘)““‘. By Corollary 6.3. ((p’ )“)“” ‘- IS valid in NPL iff (p+ )‘I is a standard 
propositional tautology. The result IOllows. I: 
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We can use Corollary 6.6 to obtain an axiomatization of NPL. To prove that a 
propositional formula p in L: Lt is valid, we first drive negations down until they apply 
only to primitive propositions, by applying the equivalences given by the next lemma. 
Lemma 6.7. 
(1) -19 is logically equivalent to gz 
(2) -( (0 -+ ~4) is logically equivalent to ( (-+b -+ 190) -+ false). 
(3) -( 40 A 4) is logically equivalent to (1sp -false) c-) +. 
Proof. ( 1) is simply Proposition 2.1( 1) . We now show (2). 
(Xu) I= ‘(40 - Q) iff (Xu”) &c (40 - +I, 
iff (Ku*) bp and (Ku*) Fe, 
iff (S,u) p 150 and (SU) k -9, 
iff (KU) F (+- -cp), 
iff (Su) b ((+cf lcp) -false). 
As for (3), 
(S,u) ++PAcCI) iff (S,u*) FsoAccI, 
iff (S,U*) p p or (SU”) p+, 
iff (S, u) t= 1~ or (S, u> b -$, 
iff (S,u) p (1~ -false) or (Su) k-4, 
iff (S,u) /= (140 -false) q 3. 0 
Consider the following axiom system N, where I+% + r,/& is an abbreviation of ($1 -+ 
$22) A t*2 - $1): 
PL. All substitution instances of formulas pnst, where p E Lt is a standard propositional 
tautology. 
NPLl. (-40) = p. 
NPLZ -( p 9 fi) + ( ( -I,!J * 7~) -false) 
NPL3. y(p~+) G+ ( (lcp -false) cf -I+?). 
RO. From 40 and 9 it @ infer +4 (modus ponens). 
Note that rule RO is different from the standard modus ponens, in that - is used 
instead of =+. When necessary, we shall refer to “from (D and (p =+ @ infer +” as 
standard modus ponens, and rule RO as nonstandard modus ponens. 
An example shows the importance of considering substitution instances in PL. The 
formula yy - -v/ is not of the form qc+‘“‘. since every formula qnst is negation-free. 
However, my - -mq is an instance of PI,, since it is the result of substituting 14 for p 
in the formula p c--i 17. which is (p -== p)nst. 
Note that NPLI-NPL3 correspond to Lemma 6.7. As we noted, they are useful in 
driving negations down. 
Remark 6.8. PL can be replaced by the nonstandard version of any complete axiom- 
atization of standard propositional logic for the language Let. That is, assume that 
standard modus ponens alon g with axioms Sl . . Sk give a sound and complete ax- 
iomatization of standard propositional logic for the language Ct. We can replace PL by 
s I ““. . . Sk”“. and get an equivalent axiomatiLation. This is because on the one hand, 
s I I”’ , . Sk”“ are special cases of PL. so the new axiomatization is no stronger. On 
the other hand. let cp t Ct be a standard propositional tautology, so that qnst is an an 
instance of PL. By completeness, there is a proof ~1,. , p,,! of p using Sl.. . , Sk 
and standard modus ponens. where (p,), is cp, and where each cp, is either an axiom (an 
instance of one of S I , . Sk) or the result of applying standard modus ponens to earlier 
formulas in the proof. WC now show by induction on i that each c,c+‘~’ (and in particular, 
(F”” ) is provable from S I ““. . Sk”“’ along with nonstandard modus ponens. This is 
immcdiatc if q~, i\ an instance of one of S I. . SX-. Assume now that cp; is the result 
of applying standard modus ponens to earlier formulas 40, and (D; =+ q, in the proof. 
By induction assumption, ,:I” and (9, -=L pf )“‘[ (that is, p.7” ~-t 4”:“) are provable 
from S I ‘I”. . Sk”“ Ctlong with nonstandard modus ponens. By one more application 
of nonstandard modus ponens. it foiiows that cp, is similarly provable. 
Theorem 6.9. N i.v (1 sound cm1 cottlplett~ Ltxiottratizatiorz,for NPL. 
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The only inference rule in our axiom system N that we just asserted to be sound and 
complete is modus ponens. We now introduce a new propositional inference rule that 
WC shall show is also sound. Of course. we do not need it for completeness (since it 
is not a rule of N). However. it will be useful in the next subsection, when we give a 
complete axiomatization for our nonstandard logic of knowledge. The new rule, which 
wc call tlegntion wplacw7wwt. is: 
Lemma 6.10. Tlw ttqatiotr repluwttwtt wlr is .soundfor NPL. 
Proof. Assume that cp in+ ,@/.sr is valid. Assume that S = (s, t) is an arbitrary NPL 
structure. and II c {s. f}. Then (S. II* ) k Cqc C--T false), since q -+ filse is valid. So 
(S. II* ) p cp, that is (S, u) k Y,D. So lp is valid. 0 
We remark that by a similar argument, the converse rule “from 7~ infer p -,fulse” 
is also sound. 
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For both standard propositional logic and NPL, if 2 logically implies U, then “from 2 
infer u” is a sound inference rule. As we noted earlier, the converse is true for standard 
propositional logic, but not for NPL in general. For example, even though the negation 
replacement rule “from 40 -+ false infer 1~” is sound, sp c, false does not logically 
imply 7~ (since (S,u) 1 (p c, false) precisely if (S, U) p q, which is not the 
same as (S, u) k -so). Nevertheless, it can shown that testing soundness of nonstandard 
inference rules has the same computational complexity as testing logical implication in 
NPL; they are both co-NP-complete [lo]. 
6.2. A sound and complete axiomatization for the logic of knowledge 
In this subsection, we give a sound and complete axiomatization for our nonstan- 
dard logic of knowledge. We also show that a natural modification (where the only 
propositional inference rule is modus ponens) does not provide a sound and com- 
plete axiomatization. Finally, we show that the complexity of the validity problem is 
PSPACE-complete, just as for the standard case K. 
The axiomatization that we shall show is sound and complete is obtained by mod- 
ifying the axiom system K by (a) replacing propositional reasoning by nonstandard 
propositional reasoning, and (b) replacing standard implication (+) in the other ax- 
ioms and rules by strong implication (-+). Thus, we obtain the axiom system, which 
we denote by K’, which consists of all instances (for the language f?) of the axiom 
scheme and rules of inference given below: 
Al’. ( &(o A Ki ( p -+ @) ) of K;I+~ (Distribution Axiom). 
NPR. All sound inference rules of NPL. 
Rl. From (D infer Kip (Knowledge Generalization). 
Thus, one can say that in our approach agents are “nonstandardly” logically omni- 
scient. 
We shall actually show that the result of replacing NPR in K’ by modus ponens 
and negation replacement, along with all sound axioms of NPL, is complete. It follows 
easily that NPR can be replaced by any complete axiomatization of NPL that includes 
modus ponens and negation replacement as inference rules. 
In the rest of this section, when we say simply that a formula is provable, we mean 
provable in K”. We say that a formula 9 is consistent if (9 -false) is not provable. 
A finite set (~1,. . . , ppk} of formulas is said to be consistent exactly if ~1 A . . . A qk is 
consistent, and an infinite set of formulas is said to be consistent exactly if all of its finite 
subsets are consistent. (We do not worry about which parenthesization of ~1 A . . A pk 
to use, since they are all provably equivalent by NPR.) 
Before we prove completeness of K’, we need to prove some lemmas. 
Lemma 6.11. Let V be a consistent set of formulas of Cc’. Then V is a maximal 
consistent set ifffor each formula p of Cc”, either 40 or ((D it false) is in V. 
Proof. We first prove the “if” direction. Let cp be a formula of _Cc’ that is not in V. By 
assumption, (cp -,fulse) t V. But 
( p A (lp L-i ,fulse) ) -,ful.rr 
is an instance of NPR. Hence, V 1.J {cp} : i\ inconsistent. So V is maximal. 
We now prove the “only if” direction. Assume that V is a maximal consistent set. 
Assume that neither rp nor (cp c--~,fnlsr) is in V. Since q~ g! V, it follows by maximality 
of V that there is a finite conjunction y!~ of certain members of V such that I/J A p 
is inconsistent. that is, ((I++ A p) -+ @se) is provable. Similarly, there is a finite 
conjunction q?’ of certain members of V such that (I,# A (cp - false) - ,@se) is 
provable. Now the formula 
is an instance of NPR. since it is a substitution instance of 
( 1( p A q ) * ( -1( p’ A 7y ) -=a 1( p A p’ ) ) ) “s’ 
By ( I ) and two applications of modus ponens, we see that I++ A y9’ is inconsistent. This 
contradicts consistency of V. 3 
Proof. Assume that cp is provable. If cp @ V. then by Lemma 6.1 I, (C,C + ,firl.se) t V. 
NOV. 
+c c- ( (rp 4 fdse) -+ ,)dsr) (2) 
is an instance of NPR. Since cp is provable, by (2) and modus ponens, so is ((cp 4 
f&p) +,false). Since (cp ~ful~e) t V. it follows that V is inconsistent. So cp E V. 
Assume now that cp E V and (cp c-i $) t V. If 1+9 $ V, then by Lemma 6. I 1, 
(9 L--,f&r) t V. But 
is an instance of NPR. So V is inconsistent, a contradiction. 
Assume now that cp A (c, E V, but that q # V or Cc, # V. Say for the sake of definiteness 
that q 6 V. By Lemma 6. I I, (cp ~-false) t V. Now 
((p-+fufalse) A((pA$)) -+,fulse)) 
is an instance of NPR. That is, the set {‘p A $, (q - false)} is inconsistent, so V is 
inconsistent, a contradiction. 17 
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We are now ready to state completeness of K’. 
Theorem 6.13. K’ is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to NM for 
formulas in the language L-. 
Proof. See Appendix A. Cl 
Remark 6.14. We can, of course, replace NPR by those propositional axioms and rules 
that are actually used in the proof of Theorem 6.13 (including those used in the proofs 
of lemmas). The propositional rules that were used are modus ponens and negation 
replacement. 
When we presented the axiom system K we remarked that PR can be replaced by any 
complete axiomatization of standard propositional logic that includes modus ponens as 
an inference rule. Surprisingly, this is not the case here, as the next theorem shows. 
Theorem 6.15. The result of replacing NPR by all substitution instances of valid 
formulas of NPL, with modus ponens as the sole propositional inference rule, is not a 
complete axiomatization with respect to NM for formulas in the language C’. 
Proof. Let A be the axiom system described in the statement of the theorem. Let y be 
the formula (lK1 true) -+ false. We leave to the reader the straightforward verification 
that y is valid. However, we now show that y is not provable in A. For the purposes of 
this proof only, we shall treat not only the primitive propositions, but also all formulas 
of the form Ki$, where q? E C’, as if they were primitive propositions. 
Let us call this enlarged set of primitive propositions @‘. Similarly to the proof of 
Theorem 4.2, let s be the truth assignment where s(p) = true for every p E @‘, and let t 
be the truth assignment where t(p) = false for every p E @J’. Let S be the NPL structure 
(s, t), and let T be the set of all formulas (;p such that (S, s) b 40. We now show 
( 1) Every formula provable in A is in T. 
(2) y is not in T. 
Of course, this is sufficient to show that y is not provable in A, as desired. 
We first show that every formula provable in A is in T. Let ~1, . . , cp,, be a proof in 
A. We shall show, by induction on j, that each (Pj is in T, that is, (S, s) k qj. 
( 1) If p,i is an instance (Kip A Ki( p + @) ) it Ki$ of the distribution axiom, then 
(S, S) b pj, since (A’, S) k K& (because KirC, E @‘). 
(2) If p,i is a substitution instance of a valid formula of NPL, then (S, s) k (Pj, 
because (S, s) is an NPL structure. 
(3) If (4i is proven from an earlier gOk by knowledge generalization, then Spi is of the 
form Ki@, and SO (S, s) k pj by construction (because pj E CD’). 
(4) If p,i follows from earlier formulas qpk and qq (where qq is q% L-f p,i) by 
modus ponens, then by induction assumption (s, s) /= qk and (s, s) b qk -+ +‘j. 
Therefore, once again, (S, s) b pj. 
We close by showing that y is not in T. By construction, (S t) F K1 true, because 
K, true E @‘. Therefore, (S, s) k SKI true, so (S, s) p (7Kl true) of false, that is, 
(S, s) p y. So y @ T, as desired. 0 
It lOllows immediately from Theorem 6.15 that if NPR is replaced by a complete 
axiomatization of NPL with modus ponens as the sole propositional inference rule 
(such as the system N of the previous subsection), then the result is not a complete 
axiomatization for our nonstandard logic of knowledge. However, the proof of Theo- 
rem 6. I.3 shows that NPR can be replaced by any complete axiomatization of NPL that 
includes modus ponens and negation replacement as inference rules, and still maintain 
completeness. 
Just as we can embed standard propositional logic into NPL by using “I (see Propo- 
sition 6.2), we can similarly embed standard epistemic logic into our nonstandard 
cpistemic logic. It then follows, as with the propositional case (Theorem 6.4), that the 
complexity of the validity problem for standard epistemic logic is a lower bound on the 
complexity of the validity problem in our nonstandard epistemic logic. The correspond- 
ing upper bound can be proved by well-known techniques [ 181. Thus, the complexity 
of the validity problem is PSPACE-complete. just as for the standard case K. 
Theorem 6.16. The wlidity problenljbr C ~-~#orndas with respect to NM is PSPACE- 
cwnplete. 
7. A payoff: querying knowledge bases 
As we have observed, logical omniscience still holds in the nonstandard approach, 
though in a weakened form. We also observed that the complexity of reasoning about 
knowledge has not improved. Thus, the gain from our nonstandard approach seems quite 
modest. We now show an additional nice payoff for our approach: we show that in a 
certain important application we can obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for reasoning 
about knowledge. 
The application is one we have alluded to earlier, where there is a (finite) knowledge 
base ol‘ facts. Thus. the knowledge base can he viewed as a formula K. A query to the 
knowledge base is another formula cp. There arc two ways to interpret such a query. First, 
we can ask whether cp is a consequence of K. Second, we can ask whether knowledge 
of (o follows from knowledge of K. Fortunately. these are equivalent questions, as we 
now see. 
Proposition 7.1. Let cpl ~177d cp, hr L ~~~Ijormula.r. Then 91 logically implies (p2 bvith 
sespect to NM $f Kipl logically implies K,q with respect to NM. 
Proof. It is easy to see that if cp~ logically implies 92 with respect to NM, then K,cp, 
logically implies K,(P~ with respect to NM. WC now show the converse. 
Assume that 91 does not logically imply ‘p2 with respect to NM. Let M = (S, 7r, K;I, 
. . . . K,,.” ) be a nonstandard structure and u a world of M such that (M, u) b cpl and 
( Ad, 77) f (~1. Define a new nonstandard structure M’ = (S’, n-‘, K;‘, . , ICI:,,+ ) with one 
additional world t cgi S by letting (a) S’ = S LJ {t}, (b) rr’( s) = n(s) for s E S, and 
r’(t) be arbitrary, (c) Kc: = K, for j f i. and k;: = K, U {(t,u)}, and (d) st = s* for 
.s F S. and tt = t. It is straightforward to set that since (M, U) b cp1 and (M,m) v ‘p?, 
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also (M’, u) /= ~1 and (M’, U) F (~2. But then (M’, t) /= &pi and (M’, t) p Kip2, and 
hence K/PI does not logically imply Kiq2 with respect to NM. 0 
We focus here on the simple case where both the knowledge base and the query are 
standardly propositional (i.e., no r). We know that in the standard approach deter- 
mining whether K logically implies cp is co-NP-complete. Is the problem of determining 
the consequences of a knowledge base in the nonstandard approach (i.e., determining 
whether K logically implies cp, or equivalently, by Proposition 7.1, whether K~K logically 
implies Kip) any easier? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is negative (since if 
9 is f&e, then the problem is the same as deciding whether -K is a tautology of NPL, 
which is co-NP-hard by Theorem 6.4.) There is, however, an interesting special case 
where using the nonstandard semantics does make the problem easier. 
Define a literal to be a primitive proposition p or its negation up, and define a clause 
to be a disjunction of literals. For example, a typical clause is pV~qVr. We can consider 
a traditional database as being a collection of atomic facts, which can be thought of as 
primitive propositions. It is often an implicit assumption that if an atomic fact does not 
appear in a database, then its negation can be considered to be in the database (this 
assumption is called the closed world assumption [24]). We can imagine a database 
that explicitly contains not only atomic facts but also negations of atomic facts. This 
would correspond to a database of literals. More generally yet, we could consider a 
database (or knowledge base) of clauses, that is, disjunctions of literals. In fact, there 
are many applications in which the knowledge base consists of a finite collection of 
clauses. Thus, K (which represents the knowledge base) is a conjunction of clauses. A 
formula (such as K) that is a conjunction of clauses is said to be in conjunctive normal 
form (or CNF). 
Hence, we can think of the knowledge base K as being a formula in CNF. What about 
the query p? Every standard propositional formula is equivalent to a formula in CNF 
(this is true even in our nonstandard semantics, because of Proposition 2.1) . Thus, we 
will assume that the query +Y has been transformed to CNF. (Note that we assumed that 
the knowledge base is given in CNF, while the query has to be transformed to CNF. 
The reason for this distinction is the fact that the transformation to CNF may involve 
an exponential blowup. Consequently, while we might be reasonable to apply it to the 
query, it is not reasonable to apply it to the knowledge base, which is typically orders 
of magnitude larger than the query.) 
Let us now reconsider the query evaluation problem, where both the knowledge base 
and the query are in CNF. The next proposition tells us that under the standard semantics, 
the problem is no easier than the general problem of logical implication in propositional 
logic, that is, co-NP-complete. 
Proposition 7.2. The problem of deciding whether K logically implies (D in standard 
propositional logic, for CNF formulas K and (o, is co-NP-complete. 
Proof. Let K be an arbitrary CNF formula, and let p be a primitive proposition that 
does not appear in K. Now K logically implies p in standard propositional logic iff K is 
unsatisfiable in standard propositional logic. This is because if K =+ p is valid, then SO 
is K =+ up, and hence K + (p A -p ). This is sufficient to prove the proposition, since 
the problem of determining nonsatisfiability of a CNF formula is co-NP-complete. 0 
By contrast, the problem is feasible under the nonstandard semantics. Before we show 
this. we need a little more machinery. 
Let us say that clause CYI includes clause LY 2 if every literal that is a disjunct of aye 
is a disjunct of a~?_. For example, the clause p V ‘q V Tr includes the clause p V 14. 
The next theorem characterizes when K logically implies (D in NPL, for CNF formulas 
K and 9. 
Theorem 7.3. Let K and q be propositionalformulus in CNE Then K logically implies 
cp in NPL iff evey clause qf (o includes u cluuse of K. 
Proof. The “if” direction, which is fairly straightforward, is left to the reader. We now 
prove the other direction. Assume that some clause a of 9 includes no clause of K. 
We need only show that there is an NPL structure S = (s, t) such that (S, S) b K but 
(S, S) v cp. Define s(p) = false iff p is a disjunct of (Y, and t(p) = true iff lp is a 
disjunct of cy, for each primitive proposition p. We now show that (S, s) &c (Y’, for each 
disjunct cy’ of CX. If a’ is a primitive proposition p, then s(p) = false, so (S, s) p a’; if 
a’ is up, where p is a primitive proposition, then t(p) = true, so (S, t) b p, so again 
(S,s) FLY’. Hence, (S,s) p cy, so (s. s) p 9. However, (s, s) k K, since every conjunct 
K’ of K has a disjunct K” where (s, s) b K” (otherwise, cy would include K’). 0 
An example where Theorem 7.3 would bc false in standard propositional logic occurs 
when K is q V lq and p is I? V yp. Then K logically implies ~0 in standard propositional 
logic, but the single clause 17 V --up of cp does not include the single clause of K. Note 
that K does not logically imply p in NPL. 
It is clear that Theorem 7.3 gives us a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding 
whether one CNF formula implies another in the nonstandard approach. 
Theorem 7.4. There is u polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding whether K 
logically implies cp in NPL (or KiK logically implies Kiq with respect to NM), for 
CNF formulas K and 40. 
Theorems 7.3 and 7.4 yield an efficient algorithm for the evaluation of a CNF query 
Ic, with respect to a CNF knowledge base K: answer “Yes” if K logically implies $ in 
NPL. By Theorem 7.4, logical implication of CNF formulas in NPL can be checked 
in polynomial time, and Theorem 7.3 implies that any positive answer we obtain from 
testing logical implication between CNF fomulas in the nonstandard semantics will 
provide us with a correct positive answer for standard semantics as well. This means that 
even if we are ultimately interested only in conclusions that are derivable from standard 
reasoning, we can safely use the positive conclusions we obtain using nonstandard 
reasoning. Thus, the nonstandard approach yields a feasible query-answering algorithm 
for knowledge bases. Notice that the algorithm need not be correct with respect to 
negative answers. It is possible that K does not logically imply $ in NPL even though 
K logically implies $ with respect to standard propositional logic. 
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Theorem 7.4 was essentially proved in [ 201. The precise relationship to Levesque’s 
results will be clarified in Section 9. Levesque’s result (like Theorem 7.4) applies only to 
propositional formulas K. Lakemeyer [ 191 extended it to modal formulas for the single- 
agent case. He defined the class of extended-conjunctive-normal-form (ECNF) formulas 
and showed that Theorem 7.4 holds also for ECNF formulas [ 191. Thus, his result 
shows that under the nonstandard semantics, there are nontrivial tractable fragments 
of the language that include modal formulas. Interestingly, a 4-valued semantics was 
also used in a different context in order to deal with computational complexity; Patel- 
Schneider defined a 4-valued terminological logic with tractable subsumption [ 221. 
8. Standard-world validity 
Logical omniscience arises from considering knowledge as truth in all possible worlds. 
In the approach of this paper, we modify logical omniscience by changing the notion 
of truth. In this section, we consider the impossible-worlds approach, where we modify 
logical omniscience by changing the notion of possible world. The idea is to augment 
the possible worlds by impossible worlds, where the customary rules of logic do not 
hold. Even though these worlds are logically impossible, the agents nevertheless may 
consider them possible. Unlike our approach, where nonstandard worlds are considered 
just as realistic as standard worlds, under the impossible-worlds approach the impossible 
worlds are a figment of the agents’ imagination; they serve only as epistemic alternatives. 
Since agents consider the impossible worlds when computing their knowledge, logical 
omniscience need not hold. For example, suppose that an agent knows all formulas in 
_Z’, and ,X logically implies 40. Since the agent knows all formulas in 2, all formulas in 
2 must hold in all the worlds that the agent considers possible. However, even though ,Z 
logically implies (p, it can happen that p does not hold at one of the impossible worlds 
the agent considers possible, and so the agent may not know 4p. The key point here 
is that logical implication is determined by us, rational logicians for whom impossible 
worlds are indeed impossible. We do not consider impossible worlds when determining 
logical implication. 
There are various impossible-worlds approaches (see, for example, [ 231 and [ 291)) 
depending on how we choose the possible and impossible worlds. In what follows, we 
shall take the possible worlds to be the standard worlds, and the impossible worlds to 
be the nonstandard worlds. 
The difference between our approach and the impossible-worlds approach is that in 
our approach the distinction between standard and nonstandard worlds does not play 
any role. In the impossible-worlds approach, however, the standard worlds (those where 
s = s*) have a special status. Intuitively, although an agent (who is not a perfect 
reasoner) might consider nonstandard worlds possible (where, for example, p A up or 
Kip A 7K;p holds), we as logicians do not consider such worlds possible; surely in the 
real world a formula is either true or false, but not both. 
This distinction plays an important role in the way validity and logical implication 
are defined. In the impossible-worlds approach we consider nonstandard worlds to be 
“impossible”, and thus consider a formula p to be valid if it is true at all of the 
“possible” worlds, that is, at all of the standard worlds. Formally, define a formula of 
C to be standard-world valid if it is true at every standard world of every nonstandard 
structure. The definition for standard-world logical implication is analogous. 
The reader may recall that, under the nonstandard semantics, 3 behaves peculiarly. In 
particular. + does not capture the notion of logical implication. In fact, that was one of 
the motivations to the introduction of strong implication. At standard worlds, however, 
+ and + coincide, that is, cpl =+ qo? holds at a standard world precisely if q01 c-i ~2 
holds. It follows that even though =+ does not capture logical implication, it does 
capture standard-world logical implication. The following analogue to Proposition 5.2 is 
immediate. 
Proposition 8.1. Let cpl and I~J he ,fi~rmulas irk l. Then 91 standard-world logically 
implies cpz if cpj -> 91 i.s standcud-rr,orid valid. 
The main feature of the impossible-worlds approach is the fact that knowledge is 
computed over all worlds, while logical implication is evaluated only over standard 
worlds. As a result we avoid logical omniscience. For example, an agent does not 
necessarily know valid formulas of standard propositional logic. Specifically, although 
the classical tautology ,O V 717 is standard-world valid, an agent may not know this 
formula at a standard world s. since the agent might consider an incomplete world 
possible. 
Let q he a formula that contains precisely the primitive propositions pi,. , pk. Define 
Complcte(cp) to be the formula 
Thus. Complete( cp) is true at a world .s precisely if s is complete as far as all the 
primitive propositions in q arc concerned. In particular, if (o is propositional, and it 
Complete( cp) is true at s, then it follows by a simple induction on formulas that s is 
complete with respect to cp. 
Let cp he a tautology of standard propositional logic. Clearly cp is true at every world 
.V that is complete and coherent (with respect to all of the primitive propositions in 40). 
The next proposition implies that if we assume only that s is complete, then this is still 
enough to guarantee that cp be true at s. 
Proposition 8.2. Let cp De a standard propositional formula. Then q~ is a tautology of 
standard proposibonal logic iff Complete( cp) logically implies (o in NPL. 
Proof. Assume first that Complete(q) logically implies 40 in NPL. To show that q is 
a tautology of standard propositional logic. we need only show that cp is true at every 
world that is complete and coherent. But this is the case, since if s is complete, then by 
assumption cp is true at s. 
Assume now that cp is a tautology of standard propositional logic, and (S,u) b 
Complete(p). Let 1v be the set of primitive propositions that appear in 9. Thus, (S, M) k 
p V 71’ for each p E F. Hence, either (S, M) 1 p or (S, U) k lp, for each p E V. Define 
the truth assignment I’ by letting II(~)) = true if (S. u) k p and u(p) = false otherwise. 
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Note in particular that if o(p) = false, then (S, U) k lp. By a straightforward induction 
on formulas, we can show that for each propositional formula fi all of whose primitive 
propositions are in p, we have 
( 1) If # is true under u, then (S, u) + fi. 
(2) If Cc, is false under u, then (S, U) b +. 
Now q is true under u, since q is a tautology of standard propositional logic. So from 
what we just showed, it follows that (S, U) k qo. Hence, Complete(p) logically implies 
40 in NPL. 0 
From Theorem 8.2 we obtain immediately the proof we promised of part of Theo- 
rem 2.3, that the logical implication problem in NPL- is co-NP-complete. The proof of 
Theorem 4.3 (that the logical implication problem for L-formulas in nonstandard struc- 
tures is PSPACE-complete) follows from a generalization of Proposition 8.2. Define Eqo 
(“everyone knows 9”) to be Kt 9 A . . A K,,q, where the agents are 1,. . . , n. Define 
lZeq to be p, and inductively define E’+‘q to be EE’qo. We now define the depth of a 
formula p, denoted depth(q), as follows: 
l depth(p) = 0 if p is a primitive proposition; 
l depth( -rp) = depth(p) ; 
l depth(m An) =max(depth(~l),depth(~2)); and 
l depth( Kip) = depth( PO) + 1. 
Proposition 8.3. Assume (o E L: has depth d. Then qo is valid with respect to standard 
structures ifSComplete( 9) A E( Complete( 9) ) A. .A Ed (Complete( p) ) logically implies 
p in nonstandard structures. 
Proof. The proof is a fairly straightforward generalization of that of Proposition 8.2. 
The details are omitted. 0 
Ladner [ 181 showed that the PSPACE lower bound for validity in standard structures 
(Theorem 3.2) holds even when there is only one agent. If we replace E in Proposi- 
tion 8.3 by KI , then it follows from Proposition 8.3 that there is a polynomial reduction 
of validity in standard structures with one agent to the logical implication problem for 
L-formulas in nonstandard structures with one agent. The PSPACE lower bound in The- 
orem 4.3 now follows (even when there is only one agent). The upper bound follows 
from Theorem 6.16. 
If (D is a tautology of standard propositional logic, then an agent need not know 9, 
even at a standard world, since q may be false at an incomplete world that the agent 
considers possible. The next theorem says that if the agent knows that the world is 
complete, then he must know the tautology 40. This theorem follows from results in [9]. 
Theorem 8.4. Let p be a tautology of standard propositional logic. Then 
Ki( Complete( 9) ) + Kip is standard-world valid. 
Proof. By Proposition 8.2, Complete(q) logically implies q in NPL. Hence, by Propo- 
sition 7.1, Ki( Complete( p)) logically implies KiqO with respect to NM. It follows by 
Proposition 8.1 that Ki(Complete( p)) + Kiqo is standard-world valid. 0 
Another form of logical omniscience that fails under the impossible-worlds approach is 
closure under implication: it is easy to see that the formula (KiqAK,(q + 9)) + K& is 
not standard-world valid. This lack of closure results from considering incoherent worlds 
possible: indeed, it is not hard to see that (K;p A Ki( q + $) ) + Ki($ V (q A -p) ) is 
standard-world valid. That is, if an agent knows that 50 holds and also knows that sp + +!J 
holds, then he knows that either I,+ holds or the world is incoherent. If the agent knows 
that the world is coherent, then his knowledge is closed under logical implication. We 
now formalize this observation. 
Let (9 be a formula that contains precisely the primitive propositions ~1, . . , pk. Define 
Coherent(p) to be the formula 
Thus, Coherent(q) is true at a world s precisely if s is coherent as far as all the 
primitive propositions in q are concerned. In particular, if Coherent(q) holds at $, then 
s is coherent with respect to 9.’ 
The next theorem says that knowledge of coherence implies that knowledge is closed 
under implication. 
Theorem 8.5. Let cp and cc/ De stcmlnrd propositionul ,formulus. Therz 
is standard-world valid. 
Proof. Denote K;(Coherent( 9) f A Kip A K,(qz =+ #) by 7. By Proposition 8.1, it is 
sufficient to show that 7 standard-world logically implies Ki$. We shall show the stronger 
fact that 7 logically implies Kill/ with respect to NM. Let M = (S, n-, ICI,. . . , K,,,* ) 
be a nonstandard structure, and s a world of M. Assume that 7 is true at s and that 
(s, I) E K,, so Coherent(q) is true at t. By a straightforward induction on formulas, we 
can show that for every propositional formula y all of whose primitive propositions are 
contained in 50, it is not the case that both y and ly are true at t. Now q and q + 9 
are both true at r, since Kiq~ and Ki( cp + $) are true at s. Since 9 is true at t, it follows 
from what we just showed that lcp is not true at t. Since q + 9 is an abbreviation for 
~cp V t,b. it follows that 3 is true at f. Hence, K+.,!J is true at s. 0 
Theorems 8.4 and 8.5 explain why agents are not logically omniscient: “logically” is 
defined here with respect to standard worlds, but the agents may consider nonstandard 
worlds possible. If an agent considers only standard worlds possible, so that we have the 
antecedents Ki( Complete( 9) ) and K,( Coherent( 9) ) of Theorems 8.4 and 8.5, then this 
agent is logically omniscient (more accurately, he knows every tautology of standard 
propositional logic and his knowledge is closed under implication). 
’ Note that Coherent(p) is not definable in C but only 111 Lc’. This is because if there were a formula in 
L that says that at most one of p or 117 is true. then cp would have to be false at the state t of Theorem 4.2, 
since both p and yp are true at t. However, ip (along with every formula of L) is true at f. 
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We conclude the discussion of the impossible-world approach by reconsidering the 
knowledge base situation discussed earlier, where the knowledge base is described by a 
formula K and the query is described by a formula 40. We saw earlier (Proposition 7.1) 
that in the nonstandard approach, p is a consequence of K precisely when knowledge 
of p is a consequence of knowledge of K. 
The situation is different under the impossible-worlds approach. On one hand, impli- 
cation of knowledge coincides in both approaches. 
Proposition 8.6. Let qol and 972 be .P-formulas. Then KiSpl standard-world logicallj 
implies Ki(D2 iff Kipl logically implies Kip2 in nonstandard structures. 
Proof. The proof, which is very similar to that of Proposition 7.1, is left to the 
reader. Cl 
On the other hand, the two interpretations of query evaluation differ in the impossible- 
worlds approach. In contrast to Proposition 7.1, it is possible to find ~1 and ~2 in L 
such that ~1 standard-world logically implies (~2, but Kipl does not standard-world 
logically imply Kip2 (let ~1 be p A up, and let ‘p2 be 9). The reason for this 
failure is that cpi standard-world logically implying 402 deals with logical implica- 
tion in standard worlds, whereas Kipl standard-world logically implying Kip2 deals 
with logical implication in worlds agents consider possible, which includes nonstandard 
worlds. 
The difference between the two interpretations of query evaluation in the standard 
approach can have a significant computational impact. Consider the situation where both 
K and 9 are CNF propositional formulas. Theorem 7.4 and Proposition 8.6 tell us that 
testing whether KiK standard-world logically implies Kip can be done in polynomial 
time. However, in this case, testing whether K standard-world logically implies 9 is 
co-NP-complete, according to Proposition 7.2. 
9. Levesque and Lakemeyer’s formalism 
In this section, we relate our results to those of Levesque [ 201 and Lakemeyer [ 191. 
First, we relate our syntax and semantics to theirs. 
Levesque and Lakemeyer also attempt to decouple the semantics of a formula from 
that of its negation, but their approach is different from ours. We briefly discuss the 
details, and then present their formal semantics. 
Define a nonstandard truth assignment to be a function that assigns to each literal 
a truth value. (Recall that a literal is either a primitive proposition p or its negation 
-p.) Thus, although an ordinary truth assignment assigns a truth value to each primitive 
proposition p, a nonstandard truth assignment assigns a truth value to both p and lp, for 
each primitive proposition p. Under a given nonstandard truth assignment, it is possible 
that both p and up can be assigned the value true, or that both can be assigned false, 
or that one can be assigned true and the other false. This decouples the semantics of p 
and lp. As we shall show below, it is quite straightforward to decouple the semantics of 
a conjunction from its negation, once we have already done so for each of its conjuncts. 
Levesque and Lakemeyer do not have q in the language, so there is no need for them 
to decouple the semantics of p c+ $ from -( +O q Q). Finally, in order to decouple 
the semantics of Kiq and lK,p, Lakemeyer introduces two possibility relations, K+ and 
A,, 
A Levesque-Lukemeyer structure (or LL structure for short) is a tuple 
M = (S. 37, k:; . , A:,; . k’( . . A’,, ). 
where S is a set of worlds. rr( s) is a nonstandard truth assignment for each world 
.S t S. and each li,- and K,- is a binary relation on S. To define the semantics, Levesque 
introduces two “support relations” k7. and kF Intuitively, (M, S) b p (where T stands 
for “true”) means that the truth of cp is supported at (M, s), while (M, s) kF p (where 
E‘ stands for “false”) means that the falsity of cp is supported at (M, s). We say that 
(M. s) k cp if (M, S) b. C,D. The semantics is as follows: 
( M, s) bT p ( for a primitive proposition I’) iff r(s) (p) = true. 
(M, s) bF. p (for a primitive proposition 11) iff r(s) (-p) = true. 
(A4.s) b -ycp iff (M.3) FP+9. 
(M.s) kP ~cp iff (M.5) +, cp. 
(M..~J bT ~1 ;\,c,o? il‘l (M.s) i,.pl and (M,sJ krp2. 
(M,s) kF cp~ i\(~2 iff (M.5) FK’pl or (M,s) bF’p2. 
(M.s) b7. Kjp iff (M,t) b7.(p for all i such that Cs,t) E PC,+. 
( M, s) bF K,p iff (M, f) &cr ip for some I such that (s, t) E KC,-. 
WC also remark that Levesquc and Lakemeyer have two different flavors of knowledge 
in their papers: explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge. (Actually, they talk about 
belief rather than knowledge, hut the distinction is irrelevant to our discussion here.) We 
consider here only their notion of explicit knowledge, since this is the type that avoids 
logical omniscience. 
Although, superficially. our semantics seems quite different from the Levesque- 
Lakemeyer semantics, it is straightforward to show that in fact, the two approaches 
are equivalent in the sense of the following proposition. 
Proposition 9.1. bb‘or- each nonstandard structure M and world s in M, there is an LL 
.structure Ml and world s’ in Ml such that for each C-formula p, 
Com~ersely~ for each LL structure M’ and wvrld s’ in M’, there is a nonstandard 
structure M and world s in M such that (3) and (4) hold for each C-formula p. 
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Proof. Given a nonstandard structure M = (S, 7r, Kt , . . . , I&,* ), define an LL structure 
M= (S,r’,IcT ,..., K,+,Ic, ,..., K;) with the same set S of worlds, where for each 
state s and primitive proposition p, we have 
T’(S)(P) =r(s)(p), (5) 
~‘(s)(-p) =true iff 7r(s*>(p) =false, (6) 
and where 
K+ = Ki, 
(S, t) E Ici iff (S*, t) E Ici. 
It is easy to show by induction on the structure of p that for every world s, 
(M, s) b 9 iff (M’, s> kT P, (7) 
(M,s) 1140 iff (M’,s) kF 9. (8) 
For the converse, let M’ = (S, 7~‘, AI:, . . . , AI,+, K;, . . . , K;) be an LL structure. We 
define a nonstandard structure M = (S U S’, TT, ICI,. . . , Ic,,* > by letting s* be a new 
world for each s E S, letting S* = {s* 1 s E S}, defining r(s) and r(s*) for s E S 
so that (5) and (6) hold for every primitive proposition p, and defining Ici to consist 
precisely of 
(1) all (s, t) such that s E S, t E S, and (s, t) E XT, and 
(2) all (s*, t) such that s* E S*, r E S, and (s, t) E KY. 
By the identical argument to before, (7) and (8) hold for every formula p and every 
state s E S. 0 
Remark 9.2. We note that there is an equivalent semantics to that of Levesque and 
Lakemeyer that avoids the use of two satisfaction relations bT and kF. That is, we 
can define a notion k’ of satisfaction directly such that if M is an LL structure, s 
is a world of M, and (o is an fZ formula, then (M, s) k qo iff (M, s) k’ 9. Rather 
than defining 1~ to be true iff cp is not true (as we do with standard structures), and 
rather than giving a uniform definition of when lcp is true (as we do with nonstandard 
structures, using *), we instead define separately what it means for q to be true and 
what it means for ~4p to be true, for each type of formula cp (that is, for primitive 
propositions, and formulas of the form 91 A ~2, up, and Kiq). This way we can make 
the truth of p and lcp independent. The definition is as follows (where we write k for 
k’, for readability) : 
( M, s) k p (for a primitive proposition p) iff r(s) (p) = true. 
(M,s) kw An iff (M,s) kql and (M,s) k(~2. 
(M, s) k KiqO iff (M, t) k q for all t such that (s, t) E KT. 
( M, s) 1 -p (for a primitive proposition p) iff 7~( s) ( -p) = true. 
(M,s) F-(CPI AC!) iff(M,s) k-401 or (M,s) k~2. 
(M,s) b ~7cp iff (M, .s) + p. 
(M, s) k lK;cp iff (M, r) p p for some t such that (s, t) E X,7. 
The proof of the equivalence to Levcsque and Lakemeyer’s semantics is straightforward, 
and is left to the reader. 
Remark 9.3. While Proposition 9.1 shows the equivalence of our approach to the 
Levesque-Lakemeyer approach, a difference between the two aproaches emerges when 
we try to model agents with certain attributes. It is well known that in the standard 
possible-world approach, agents’ attributes can often be captured by imposing certain 
restrictions on the possibility relations. For example, positive introspection of agent i 
(i.e., K,p =+ K;K;p) is captured b y requiring K, to be transitive (cf. [ 171). The same 
holds in our nonstandard approach here, i.e., positive introspection of agent i is cap- 
tured by requiring Ic; to be transitive. On the other hand, in the Levesque-Lakemeyer 
approach it suffices to impose transitivity on K,‘. Now the properties of knowledge 
differ in our approach and in the Levesque-Lakemeyer approach. For example, in our 
approach K;lK,Kip =S K,-K,p becomes valid, but this is not the case in the Levesque- 
Lakemeyer approach. Thus, the Levesque-Lakemeyer approach allows an extra degree 
of freedom in modeling agents. 
Lcvesque and Lakemeyer use standard-world validity as their notion of validity. Thus, 
their notion of logical implication is standard-world logical implication, so as in Propo- 
sition 8.1, 3 can be used to express logical implication in the language. Therefore, 
unlike us, they do not enlarge their language to include of. They obtain a completeness 
result (with some restrictions on the allowable formulas). Because they use standard- 
world validity, their axiomatization contains all standard tautologies. However (as is the 
point with impossible-worlds approaches), agents need not know all standard tautolo- 
gies. Thus, for example, 17 + 17 is valid for them, since they are considering standard 
world validity, but K;(p + p) is not, since agent i may consider a nonstandard world 
possible where p + p does not hold. 
Levesquc [ 201 proves that there is a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding 
whether K,K logically implies K,p. for CNF formulas K and p (this is the decision 
procedure described in Theorem 7.3). The existence of this polynomial-time decision 
procedure is analogous to part of Theorem 7.4. The other part of Theorem 7.4 (that 
there is a polynomial-time decision procedure for deciding whether K logically implies 
cp, for CNF formulas K and 40) is false in Levesque’s context, since he is considering 
standard-world logical implication. In particular, the analogue of Proposition 7.1 does 
not hold for him. We originally obtained Theorem 7.4 by using Levesque’s result, along 
with Proposition 8.6 (and Proposition 7. I ) 
10. Conclusions 
We have investigated a new approach to dealing with the well-known logical om- 
niscience problem in epistemic logics. The idea is to base the epistemic logic on a 
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nonstandard logic, in the hope that by taking an appropriate nonstandard logic, we can 
lessen the logical omniscience problem. 
The nonstandard propositional logic we use is NPL, which we introduce in this paper. 
NPL has a number of attractive features, including a clean semantics and an elegant 
complete axiomatization. In addition, there is a tractable (polynomial-time) decision 
procedure for evaluating a natural class of knowledge base queries. Thus, there is a 
sense in which the logical omniscience problem is not as acute when considering an 
epistemic logic based on NPL. Our approach is closely related to that of Levesque and 
Lakemeyer. Indeed, we feel that thinking in terms of NPL sheds new light on their 
results. 
There is, of course, nothing special about the role of NPL in our approach. We could 
just as well considered epistemic logics based on other nonstandard logics. Perhaps by 
considering other logics we can obtain other desirable properties. We leave consideration 
of this point to future research. 
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Appendix A. Completeness proofs 
Proof of Theorem 6.9. The axiom scheme PL is sound by Corollary 6.3. The soundness 
of NPLI, NPL2, and NPL3 follow by Lemma 6.7 and by Proposition 5.2 (which says 
that logical implication is expressed by 4). 
We now prove completeness. Assume that p is valid in NPL. Let ~1,. . . , pk be a 
sequence of formulas obtained by driving negations down (using Lemma 6.7), working 
from the outside in, until the negations apply only to primitive propositions. Thus, 
l (Dl =(a, 
l $% is pseudo-positive, and 
l p,+t is obtained from q,i by driving down a negation that is as high in the parse 
treeaspossible,forj=l,..., k-l. 
Now each ‘pi+] is obtained from qj by replacing a formula by a (provably) equivalent 
formula. Since 501 = 40 is valid, it is easy to see that each qj is valid. Our goal is to show 
that each p,j is provable in our axiom system N, so that in particular, ~1 (that is, cp) 
is provable. Since pk is pseudo-positive, it is fairly straightforward to use Corollary 6.6 
to show that qk is provable (we give the demonstration below). We would then like to 
conclude the proof by showing that if pi+1 is provable, then so is q,j, since after all, the 
only difference between pj and pj+t is that some subformula y of pj is replaced by a 
provably equivalent formula y’ to obtain pj+t. It then follows easily (as shown below) 
that we would be done if we showed that the formula 
(Y + 7’) + (P.j+l L, P.j) (A.11 
were provable, We shall show below that in fact, (A. 1) is an instance of PL. This is 
not obvious, since there may be negations in (A. I ). 
We now give the details of the proof. We show by backwards induction on j (for 
,j = k,k- 1 . . . . , 1) that each 9, is provable. As we observed above, each pJ is valid, so 
in particular, pk is valid. Since qk is also pseudo-positive, it follows from Corollary 6.6 
that ( (qk)+)“’ is a standard propositional tautology. So (( (pk)+)St)“st is an instance of 
axiom scheme PL. By Lemma 6.1, (( (pk) ’ )st)nst = (qk)+. Thus, (pk)+ is an instance 
of axiom scheme PL. A substitution instance of (qk)+, and hence an instance of PL, 
is obtained by replacing every occurrence of p by lp (where p is the new primitive 
proposition that replaces every occurrence -3~ in 9 when we form (qk) + from pk). 
Therefore, qk is simply an instance of PL, and so is of course provable. This takes care 
of the base case j = k of the induction. 
Assume inductively that cp;~+r is provable. Now cp,+t is obtained from ‘p,i by replacing 
some (negated) subformula y of ‘p, by another formula y’. Let pr and pr! be new 
primitive propositions. Let IJ (respectively (CI’ ) be the result of replacing this occurrence 
of y (respectively y’) in ‘p, (respectively p, + 1 ) by 13~ (respectively ~~1). So $ and 50’ 
are identical, except that the unique occurrence of py in $ is replaced by prf in t,f~‘. If a 
negation appears in 4// (and hence in y9’ ), then let /.L be a negated subformula of $ that 
appears as high as possible in the parse tree of $. Since y is a negated subformula of 
9, that appears as high as possible in the parse tree of pj, it is not hard to see that pv is 
not a subformula of p. Hence p is a subformula of cp,+ 1. Replace ,u in (c, (respectively 
rl/‘) by a new primitive proposition 11~. Continue this process until all negations are 
replaced. Call the final result /I (respectively /?’ ) Note that p and p’ are negation-free, 
and are identical, except that the unique occurrence of pv in p is replaced by ~~1 in /3’. 
The formula 
(PY =pY) - (p’-p) 
is an instance of PL. By construction, ‘p, (respectively qJ+t) is a substitution instance 
of p (respectively p’). Hence, the formula (A.1 ) above is an instance of PL. Now 
(Y = y’) is an instance of one of the axiom schemes NPLl, NPL2, or NPL3, and so is 
provable. So by modus ponens. p,+l - ‘p, is provable. Since by induction assumption 
‘p,_l is provable, it follows by modus ponens that so is ‘pi, as desired. This completes 
the induction step. n 
Proof of Theorem 6.13. Soundness is easy to verify. We give a Makinson-style [ 21 J 
proof of completeness, which follows the same genera1 lines as the proof of completeness 
of K for standard structures that is given by Halpern and Moses [ 171. In order to prove 
completeness, we must show that every formula in C” that is valid with respect to 
NM is provable. We now show that it suffices to prove: 
Every consistent formula in L: - is satisfiable with respect to AfM. (A.2) 
For suppose we can prove (A.2), and p is a valid formula in Cc’. If (a is not provable, 
then neither is ( (p +fufse) -false), since 
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is an instance of NPR. So by definition, (q -+ false) is consistent. It follows from 
(A.2) that (D L, false is satisfiable with respect to NM, contradicting the validity of (p 
with respect to NM. 
Following the Makinson-style approach, we construct a canonical structure MC E 
NM, which has a world sv corresponding to every maximal consistent set V. We then 
show 
tMC,w) l=soiffpc Y 
i.e., the worlds in MC contains as elements precisely the formulas that they satisfy. Since 
it is easy to show that every consistent formula in C+ belongs to some maximally 
consistent set, this is sufficient to prove (A.2). 
Given a maximal consistent set V of formulas, define V* = (40 E C’ 1 -q $2 V}. We 
now show that V* is a maximal consistent set, and that V** = V. 
V* is consistent: if not, then there are 401,. . , ppk in V* such that ( (spi A. . . A pk) - 
false) is provable. By negation replacement, ~(cpi A . . A (6%) is provable. Now the 
formula 
-(qfq A...Apk) -+ (((~f,q -false) A...A (yk -false)) -fake) 
is an instance of NPR, and hence provable. By modus ponens, 
((7c,q -false) A.. . A (7ppk -+ false) > -false 
is provable, and hence by Lemma 6.12( 1) is in V. So by consistency of V, 
(7p1 L-t false) A . f . A (lqk -+ false) 
is not in V. Therefore, by Lemma 6.12(3), some T(D~ + false is not in V. Hence, by 
Lemma 6.11, Tpi is in V. Therefore, pi is not in V’, a contradiction. 
V* is maximal consistent: by Lemma 6.11, we need only show that either 9 or (9 q 
false) is in V*, for each formula 40 of L’. Assume that 40 $ V* and (p + false) # V*. 
So by definition of V’, it follows that the formulas T(D and ~(40 c, false) are each in 
V. But 
((7~) r\~(p--tfalse)) -false (A.3) 
is easily seen to be valid. Hence, ((7~) A ~(40 c_) false)) -b false is an instance of 
NPR. This shows that V is inconsistent, a contradiction. 
V** = V: we have 40 E V** iff -q # V* iff 1-q E V iff ~,0 E V, where the last step 
uses Lemma 6.12(2) and the fact that sp of 77~ and 1-q q cp are both in V by 
Lemma 6.12( 1). 
Given a set V of formulas, define lf’Ki = (9 : Kiq E V}. Let MC = (S, T, ICI, . . . , 
K,, ,* ) , where 
5’ = { ~1,: V is a maximal Km- consistent set}, 
7r(.S\/)(/‘) = 
i 
true, it’/7 E 1! 
false, ii‘ I7 $ c! 
K, = {(sV,sw): V/K, C W}, 
( S\’ ) * = s\/*. 
We show by induction on the structure of p that for all V we have (MC, sV) b qc iff 
cp t V. If’ p is a primitive proposition p, then this is immediate from the definition of 
?7( St, ) above. 
Assume that (o is a conjunction ~1 A (02. If (M’, SV) k q~, then (M”,sv) k ql and 
(MC, .sl’) k (~2, so by induction assumption cpi E V and 472 E V. Since cpt Q (‘p2 q 
(pi A pz) ) is an instance of NPR, it follows by Lemma 6.12(2) applied twice that 
(PI A cp’) t V. Conversely, if (cpt A cpz) E V, then so are qt and ~42, because of the 
following instances of NPR and Lemma 6.12(2): 
By induction assumption, (M“, sv ) b cpl and (MC, sLJ) b (~2, so (MC, sLj) k ( pl A p2). 
Assume now that q~ is of the form cpi ‘- - cp’. If (MC, sy) 19, then either (M’, sV) v 
~1 or (M’,sv) b ~2. If (M’..sts) F 91, then by induction assumption ql $ V, so by 
Lemma 6. I I, (pi - jdsr) cI V, so 9, &.-f ~2 t V because of Lemma 6.12( 2 ) and the 
fact that 
( PI ,-_fd.se) - ($91 -t $cJ) 
is an instance of NPR. If ( MZ. .Q) k ~1. then by induction assumption ‘p? E V, so 
cpl L-- p: t V, because of Lemma 6. I? ( 2) and the fact that 
is an instance of NPR. 
Conversely, assume that (cpl c+ cpz) t V. Then we cannot have both cpl E V and 
((~2 - &/se) E V. because the following instance of NPR would tell us that V is 
inconsistent: 
(p, A (‘p2 ‘-+ ,fulse) A ( tpl c--. ~2 ) ) c-- ,fid.sc. 
If cpi g! V, then by induction assumption (, MS, ~3) F (~1, so (M”, SV) k cp. If (92 at 
/k/se) @ V, then by induction assumption (M’, J‘V ) /# (92 -false), so (MC, XL)) b p. 
Assume that cp is of the form -I,+. Then (M’,.sv) k + iff (M”,(s~)*) v I/J iff 
(M’,sr,*) pr#Q (since ( SV)* = .SV- ) iff Cc, $ V* (by induction hypothesis) iff -1,,9 E V. 
Finally, assume that cp is of the form K+,/J. Assume first that cp E V. Then (1, E VK,. 
So if ( SV, SW) E K,. then it follows by definition of Ic, that $ E W, and so by induction 
hypothesis, (M’, SW) k IJ. Therefore, CM’. sky) 19, as desired. For the other direction, 
assume that (M’. .SLJ) k K,$. It follows that the set (V/K;) U {$ -, false} is not 
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consistent. For suppose not. Then it would have a maximal consistent extension W, 
and, by construction, we would have (sv, SW) E Ici. By the induction hypothesis we 
would have (MC, SW) k # - false, that is, (MC, SW) p I++, and so (MC, SV) p Ki$, 
contradicting our original assumption. Since (VKi) u {$ L) false} is not consistent, 
there must be some finite subset, say {cpt , . . . , qpk, t,b + false}, which is not consistent. 
That is, 
((401 r\...r\(~k/\($-false)) -false) 
is provable. But 
((401 A... A qk A (ti -false) ) -false) - (Sol - (502 - (. . . (cPk L, $1.. .) 
is an instance of NPR. Hence, by modus ponens, 
(01 - (‘p2 - (. . . (‘Pk L, $) . . .) 
is provable.By the knowledge generalization rule, 
G(CQl - (402 - (. . . ($3 - rcI>. . .I 
is provable. By Lemma 6.12( l), this formula is in V. Since ~1,. . . , qk are all in V/Xi, 
it follows that Kipt,. . . , Ki(ok are all in V. By repeated applications of the distribution 
axiom and by Lemma 6.12( 1) and Lemma 6.12(2), it is easy to see that Ki# E V, as 
desired. 0 
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